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Electronic Trespass in Canada: The Protection of Private
Property on the Internet
James Macdonald†

I. Introduction

Internet. Of course, this conclusion presupposes that
property rights in fact exist on the Internet. While American courts have accepted the existence of property rights
on the Internet without any real controversy, a significant body of criticism has developed around American
jurisprudence. Part III examines the critiques levelled
against the assumption of property rights inherent in
electronic trespass, and argues that there are property
rights that need to be protected on the Internet. Part IV
addresses the practical issue of whether electronic trespass is available at common law in Canada. Focusing on
the tangible quality of electronic communications and
the lack of requirement to show actual damages, this
paper concludes that electronic trespass is a viable cause
of action in Canada. Despite being a viable cause of
action, Part V examines the concerns of the anticommons movement, and considers whether Canadian
courts should forgo electronic trespass and adopt an
alternative doctrine resembling nuisance. In rejecting
such an approach, this paper concludes with a discussion
of the importance of consent as a means of imposing
rationality on the operation of electronic trespass, and
questions the usefulness of legislative reform.
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I

t is perhaps trite to observe that the rapid growth of
the Internet has led to the development of a dynamic
body of law loosely referred to as Internet law or
cyberlaw. Issues that a decade ago would have baffled
the majority of lawyers and academics — ‘‘e-commerce
patents, e-commerce law, trademark and domain name
conflicts, online copyright infringement, jurisdiction in
cyberspace, and web site liability for defamation’’ 1 — are
now firmly established areas of the law, ripe for litigation
and academic discourse. The development of Internet
law has not been even across all disciplines, however;
while intellectual property is seen as synonymous with
Internet law, tort law has for the most part been left
behind. 2 The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled on the
relationship of intellectual property to the Internet, 3 but
no court in Canada has considered the availability of
private property rights such as trespass to chattels. 4 As a
result, important questions over the application of property rights to the Internet have remained unanswered.
Canadian courts need not start from scratch when
formulating a Canadian approach to Internet property
issues. Just as tort law lags behind intellectual property
law, Canada lags behind the United States in Internet
jurisprudence. While this may be a source of frustration
for Canadian lawyers, the result is that Canadian courts
have the benefit of almost a decade of litigation in the
United States concerning the protection of property
rights on the Internet. The source of this American jurisprudence is the resurrection of the ‘‘late, largely unlamented tort of trespass to chattels’’ as the tort of electronic trespass. 5 Part II of this paper traces the
development of electronic trespass in the United States,
from the initial application of trespass to chattels to telephone communications to the creation of the doctrine
of electronic trespass to deal with spam, web robots, and
spyware.
This paper argues that Canadian courts can, and
should, adopt electronic trespass as a viable cause of
action for the protection of property rights on the

II. Electronic Trespass in the United
States
Creation of Electronic Trespass: ThriftyTel

T

he starting point for the development of electronic
trespass in the United States was the California
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v.
Bezenek. 6 While the case did not deal with the issue of
trespass over the Internet, it is important because the
court held for the first time that electronic signals were
‘‘sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of
action’’. 7
The defendants in Thrifty-Tel were involved in
what was popularly known as ‘‘phreaking’’: exploiting
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telephone networks by technological means to obtain
free services. Using a confidential access code, the
defendants used a modem to connect to the plaintiff
telephone carrier’s telephone network. Once they gained
access to the network, the defendants ran manual and
automated searches for the authorization codes required
to access the plaintiff’s automated switching network,
which in turn allowed the defendants to make free long
distance calls. While the manual searches had an apparently negligible impact on the plaintiff’s system, the automatic searches ‘‘overburdened the system’’, preventing
other users from accessing the system. 8
The plaintiff succeeded at trial on the basis of conversion in the unauthorized use of the confidential
codes. On appeal, however, the court noted that conversion actions were not traditionally allowed if they only
related to ‘‘intangible interests that are not merged with,
or reflected in, something tangible’’. 9 The court did not
fully consider this issue, since it held that the evidence
was sufficient to support an action based on the ‘‘seldom
employed’’ tort of trespass to chattel. 10 An action could
be made in trespass to chattel ‘‘where an intentional
interference with the possession of personal property has
proximately caused injury’’. 11 Quoting Prosser’s characterization of trespass to chattels as the ‘‘little brother of
conversion’’, the court emphasized the tort’s applicability
to situations where personal property was merely used
without authorization. 12
In Thrifty-Tel, the court had little difficulty concluding on the evidence that the defendants’ actions
were intentional, that the plaintiff had a possessory
interest in the telephone network, and that the defendants’ actions likely damaged the telephone network. 13 As
stated above, the court also found that an action in trespass to chattels could be based on the electronic signals
sent from the defendants’ modem over the plaintiff’s
telephone network. The court held that the original
requirement in trespass of direct physical contact had
been expanded to allow for indirect contact. Further, the
court held that the ‘‘requirement of a tangible has been
relaxed almost to the point of being discarded’’, 14 noting
that other courts had already based actions in trespass on
microscopic particles, smoke, and sound waves. 15 With
this relatively brief legal analysis — entirely contained
within a single footnote — the court established the legal
basis for parties to enforce their property rights on the
Internet.

Electronic Trespass and Spam:
CompuServe
As even the most casual user of e-mail is well aware,
spam is ‘‘unsolicited commercial e-mail’’ that clogs the
inboxes of Internet users. 16 In 2004, spam accounted for
as much as 80% of global e-mail traffic, lowering efficiency and trust in the Internet, and acting as a ‘‘direct
threat to the viability of the Internet as an effective
means of communication’’. 17 In response to the growing
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spectre of spam (and perhaps the lack of effective legislative approaches), 18 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the
United States successfully used Thrifty-Tel to find liability for spammers based on the tort of electronic trespass. 19
In CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. 20 the
plaintiff ISP sought a preliminary injunction based on
trespass to chattels to stop the defendants from sending
spam to its customers over its network. The court relied
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts for its formulation
of the proper test: ‘‘a trespass to chattel may be committed by intentionally using or intermeddling with the
chattel in possession of another’’. 21 Following Thrifty-Tel,
the court held that electronic signals were sufficiently
tangible to support a trespass action. 22
The court concluded that the defendants’ actions
diminished the value of the plaintiff’s network, even
though the defendants did not physically damage the
network. 23 The plaintiff only had to show a ‘‘diminution
of [the server’s] quality, condition or value’’; to hold otherwise would blur the distinction between conversion
and trespass to chattels. 24 The affidavit evidence of CompuServe technicians stated that storing and processing
spam placed a ‘‘tremendous burden on [CompuServe’s]
equipment’’. 25 While the court did not discuss how
much of this burden was specifically the result of the
defendant, it was satisfied that ‘‘to the extent that defendants’ multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk
space and drain the processing power of plaintiff’s computer equipment’’, the defendant’s actions reduced the
resources that CompuServe could supply its subscribers,
which in turn diminished the value the plaintiff could
derive from its computer equipment. 26 The court further
noted that the defendants’ actions resulted in customer
complaints and cancellations, which harmed CompuServe’s ‘‘business reputation and goodwill with its customers’’. 27

Electronic Trespass and Robots: eBay and
Ticketmaster
In the wake of the successful application of electronic
trespass to spam, established Internet corporations successfully widened the application of electronic trespass to
include communications between commercial parties
over the Internet in a series of cases concerned with the
use of robots. Robots, also known as spiders, Web bots,
or Web crawlers, are software agents: code designed to
automate the actions of human users. The most significant use of robots, though by no means the sole use, is to
‘‘crawl’’ the Internet to populate search engine databases.
In this capacity, robots are essential to the practical operation of the Internet. Google’s database, for instance, contains information on literally billions of Web pages; a
database this size simply could not be created, let alone
maintained, in any efficient manner by human agents.
Jeffrey Rosenfeld offers this helpfully succinct definition
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of a robot/spider and the technological process involved
in crawling:

proxy servers to circumvent eBay’s attempts to block
known IP addresses used by the robot. 37

[A] spider is a program that automatically traverses the
Web’s hypertext structure by retrieving a document, and
recursively retrieving all documents that are referenced. A
spider visits a Web page, reads it, and then follows links to
other pages within the site. This is what it means when
someone refers to a site being ‘‘spidered’’ or ‘‘crawled’’. 28

Adopting the Supreme Court of California’s reasons
in Thrifty-Tel, the court outlined the test for trespass to
chattels over the Internet as follows:
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The language in the above definition needs some
clarification: the use of terms such as ‘‘traverse’’and
‘‘crawl’’ gives the impression that the robot somehow
inhabits the target server. In reality, the robot only operates as software on the originating server, sending out
multiple requests to the target server. 29
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In admittedly broad terms, robots are used to access
the contents of Web sites for one of two reasons: (1) to
create a value-added product that does not directly compete with the target Web site; or (2) to directly compete
with the target Web site. 30 Examples of the former
include the Googlebot or MSNBot; both robots attempt
to compile a comprehensive listing of publicly accessible
content on the Internet. The generally positive impact of
these robots on the Internet is rightly lauded. 31 While
these robots are for the most part created with a commercial purpose, they do not compete directly with the
Web sites they crawl. Indeed, in the majority of cases it
will benefit the owner to have his or her Web site
crawled by these robots so the content can be found by
potential users. 32These beneficial robots (to date) have
not provoked electronic trespass litigation. 33 The second
type of robot, however, is not particularly beneficial to
the party whose server is being crawled. 34 These robots
are programmed to access a specific server, usually in an
attempt to copy the contents of a competitor’s Web site.
A robot’s activities were first held actionable in electronic trespass by a California district court in eBay, Inc.
v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 35 The defendant, Bidder’s Edge, ran
an auction aggregation Web site: instead of hosting auctions, the defendant’s Web site provided users with listings from multiple third-party auction sites. The defendant used a robot to crawl third-party auction sites,
including eBay.com, to populate its database. The defendant was initially given verbal approval to crawl the
plaintiff’s Web site while the two parties negotiated a
licensing agreement. When the negotiations ended
without success, the plaintiff requested that the defendant stop including information about eBay auctions on
its Web site. While the defendant initially complied with
the plaintiff’s request, it continued to use a robot to crawl
eBay’s servers, despite additional unsuccessful negotiations, and despite further notices from the plaintiff that
its activities were unauthorized. In response to the continued crawling of its Web site by the defendant, the
plaintiff attempted to block the Bidder’s Edge robot
through technological means. The technological
response proved largely ineffective, however; the robot
ignored eBay’s Robot Exclusion Standard, 36 and used

In order to prevail on a claim for trespass based on
accessing a computer system, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) defendant intentionally and without authorization
interfered with plaintiff’s possessory interest in the
computer system; and
(2) defendant’s unauthorized use proximately resulted
in damage to plaintiff. 38

In applying this test to the present facts, the court largely
followed the rationale used by the courts in CompuServe and subsequent spam cases.
The defendant argued that it did not access the
plaintiff’s Web site without authorization because the
Web site was freely accessible to the public. While the
court elsewhere questioned the appropriateness of comparing the passage of the defendant’s robot through the
plaintiff’s network to a physical intrusion into a ‘‘brick
and mortar’’ store, 39 the court stated that the plaintiff’s
network was private property, to which the public is
only given ‘‘conditional access’’. 40 When the defendant
crawled the Web site despite repeated requests from the
plaintiff to desist, the defendant exceeded the scope of
the plaintiff’s consent. The defendant was likewise
unsuccessful in its argument that it did not interfere
with the plaintiff’s possessory interest in the network.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to
prove a substantial interference with its possessory
interest, which was not evident on the facts. While the
court agreed that the plaintiff would likely be unable to
prove that there was a substantial interference, the court
went on to hold that while there was ‘‘some uncertainty
as to the precise level of possessory interference required
to constitute an intermeddling’’, the plaintiff was only
required to show that the defendant had ‘‘use of
another’s personal property’’. 41
In assessing whether the plaintiff would be able to
prove actual damages, the court adopted the formulation
of damages used in CompuServe: ‘‘A trespasser is liable
when the trespass diminishes the condition, quality or
value of personal property’’. 42 The defendant testified
that it sent 80,000 to 100,000 requests per day over the
plaintiff’s network. While this number may at first seem
impressive, the defendant’s actions accounted for at most
1.1% of the data transferred over the plaintiff’s network. 43
The plaintiff did not, however, claim any specific
damage above the use of its network. 44 Nonetheless, the
court held that this level of activity was likely sufficient
to find real damage:
Even if, as [Bidder’s Edge] argues, its searches use only a
small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, [Bidder’s
Edge] has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use
that portion of its personal property for its own purposes.
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The law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal
property. 45

Further, the court held that if it did not find that the
defendant’s use constituted an injury to the plaintiff, ‘‘it
would likely encourage other auction aggregators to
crawl the eBay site, potentially to the point of denying
effective access to eBay’s customers’’. 46

✄ REMOVE

Username: shirley.spalding

Date: 13-DEC-06

Time: 9:19

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_03\macdonald.dat

Seq: 4

American commentators have criticized the decision in eBay for being too expansive in its application of
electronic trespass. Maureen O’Rourke expressed the
general consensus among critics when she argued that
eBay created ‘‘a broad rule that would allow a site to
obtain an injunction against all unwanted visitors’’, a
property right that is broader than exists in real property
law (where intangible interferences are dealt with
through a balanced approach in nuisance), and trespass
to chattels (where the duration and size of the interference can limit liability). 47 In the face of this concern over
the unchecked growth of electronic trespass, however,
the availability of the tort was restricted in the first
reported decision to consider eBay.
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 48 the
defendant ran a Web site that included information on
tickets offered for sale on the plaintiff’s Web site, as well
as links to the specific pages on the plaintiff’s Web site
where users could purchase tickets. As in eBay, the information from the plaintiff’s Web site was collected with a
robot. The defendant did not receive any money from
users who purchased tickets from the plaintiff, but presumably benefited from increased traffic due to more
comprehensive listings. There was no contractual relationship between the parties, and the plaintiff took technological measures to prevent the links from the defendant’s Web site from working properly. 49 The plaintiff
brought a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to
prevent the defendant from crawling the plaintiff’s network. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. However, despite professing to
follow eBay, the court’s reasoning in Ticketmaster was at
odds with the prior decision.
The court noted that the burden the defendant’s
robot placed on the plaintiff’s network ‘‘appears very
small and there is no showing that the use interferes to
any extent with the regular business of [the plaintiff]. If it
did, an injunction might well issue. . .’’. 50 Further, the
court did not believe that denying the injunction would
likely result in other parties crawling the plaintiff’s Web
site to the point that its business would suffer. The court
even reasoned that the defendant’s activities were likely
beneficial to the plaintiff, as it possibly resulted in
increased ticket sales. The court failed to take into
account eBay’s position that any loss of processing power
was sufficient for the establishment of damages; Ticketmaster, in effect, established a minimum level of interference that was absent from eBay. Post-Ticketmaster
courts, however, largely abandoned the requirement that
the plaintiff show a minimum level of interference.
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In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 51 the plaintiff
domain name registrar brought a preliminary motion to
prevent the defendant from crawling its WHOIS
database 52 to collect information on registrants for marketing purposes. In granting the plaintiff’s motion, the
court adopted the lower standard established in eBay. 53
While the plaintiff was unable to provide any direct
measurement of the system resources tied up by the
defendant’s robot 54 (and the court did not cite any evidence that the plaintiff’s network actually had suffered
from the defendant’s actions), the court reaffirmed that
mere use, even if negligible, was sufficient to constitute
an interference with a possessory interest. The court also
accepted the plaintiff’s ‘‘floodgate’’ argument — that
allowing the defendant to continue to crawl its network
would encourage other parties to do the same — but it
considered this in connection with the irreparable harm
factor of the test for receiving an injunction, not for
whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits
of its claim.
The minimum level of interference required in
Ticketmaster was explicitly rejected in Oyster Software,
Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. 55 In this case, the defendant
used a robot to copy metatags from the plaintiff’s Web
site to improve its search engine rankings. 56 The plaintiff
brought an action against the defendant for, among
other things, trespass to chattels. The defendant brought
a motion for summary judgment on the trespass claim,
arguing that its robot did not compromise ‘‘the basic
function’’ of the plaintiff’s network. Indeed, on the plaintiff’s own evidence the defendant’s actions had a negligible effect on its network. In considering what level of
interference was required, the court concluded that Ticketmaster had incorrectly interpreted eBay; the plaintiff
had a valid claim in trespass ‘‘not because the interference was ‘substantial’ but simply because the defendant’s
conduct amounted to ‘use’ of’’ the plaintiff’s network. 57
This requirement that the plaintiff merely show ‘‘use’’
was even less onerous than in eBay, where the plaintiff
had to show some damage flowing form the interference.

Limiting Electronic Trespass: Intel
The California Supreme Court cast doubt on the correctness of the eBay approach in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 58 the
current leading case on electronic trespass. Over the
course of 21 months, Hamidi, a disgruntled former
employee of the plaintiff, sent six ‘‘mass e-mails’’ to Intel
employees via their Intel e-mail addresses. 59 The e-mails
generally criticized Intel’s business and employment
practices, and urged employees to join an advocacy
group formed by Hamidi. Despite the absence of evidence that Hamidi’s e-mails impaired the functioning of
Intel’s computer network, 60 Intel received a permanent
injunction enjoining Hamidi ‘‘from sending unsolicited
e-mail to addresses on Intel’s computer systems’’ on the
basis of trespass to chattels. 61 The California Court of
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Appeal upheld the lower court decision, stating that trespass to chattels without any proof of actual damage to
personal property was actionable because Hamidi ‘‘was
disrupting [Intel’s] business by using its property’’. 62 In a
thorough review of the relevant case law, the California
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California
Court of Appeal.
The court held that in order to succeed on a trespass action involving electronic contact, the defendant’s
actions had to cause ‘‘some actual or threatened interference with the computers’ functioning’’. 63 In the opinion
of the court, eBay should not be read, as it was in Oyster
Software, as only requiring the ‘‘use’’ of the plaintiff’s
network. 64 Instead, eBay and subsequent cases showed
that the court would grant an interlocutory injunction
when the interference was negligible only if denying the
claim would encourage others to use the plaintiff’s network in a manner that would substantially interfere with
the network’s function. 65 Thus, the court did not grant
an injunction in Ticketmaster because the defendant’s
actions were negligible and there was no threat of others
overburdening the plaintiff’s network in a similar
manner. 66 In the present case, the e-mails used only a
negligible portion of the plaintiff’s network. 67 Intel’s
complaints were concerned solely with the content of
the e-mail. In the opinion of the court, ‘‘those interests
are protected by other branches of tort law; in order to
address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to
the communication system’’. 68
Those who hoped the court would maintain the
lower standard set in eBay unsurprisingly took a negative
view of the decision:
Despite Intel’s demands that he stop, and its efforts at
self-help, Hamidi persisted in intruding where he was not
welcome. Intel posted a ‘‘Private Property, Keep Out’’ sign,
but Hamidi refused to comply, and the California Supreme
Court refuses to honor it. 69

However, for critics of eBay, the decision in Intel was
welcome because it ‘‘anchored’’ trespass to chattels ‘‘to its
traditional foundation as a means for defending possession in personal chattels. . .’’. 70 While the decision in Intel
has received a mixed reaction, most commentators agree
that its practical effect was to limit the broad application
of electronic trespass established in eBay. 71
Patricia Bellia argues that Intel not only limits the
application of eBay, but also undermines the very basis
for electronic trespass established in CompuServe. 72 The
core of Bellia’s reasoning is that the damage accepted in
CompuServe was the same type of damage rejected in
Intel. In both cases, the networks could easily accommodate the increase in traffic; the e-mails caused damage
because of their content (i.e., customers in CompuServe
and employees in Intel having to deal with unwanted
messages). Thus, plaintiffs after Intel will have to show a
significant interference with their networks to succeed. 73
This argument is not entirely satisfying. While the content of the e-mails in CompuServe may have made for a
sympathetic court, the legal analysis adopted in the
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CompuServe line of cases did not depend on the commercial nature of the e-mails. CompuServe’s network
was central to its business. The defendants’ actions limited CompuServe’s ability to use its network, leading to
customer dissatisfaction. It was not legally relevant
whether the interference came in the form of spam or
some other activity such as a robot, as long as a portion
of the network was used without consent. However, Intel
does likely mean that mere use as advocated by Oyster
Software is not enough. Given the court’s specific comparison to the level of harm experienced by ISPs in the
spam cases to Hamidi’s actions, Intel has raised the harm
requirement in electronic trespass cases dealing with email. In effect, Intel has limited the applicability of CompuServe to spam, or at the very least to non-commercial
e-mails sent in volumes indicative of spam.
George Fibbe argues that the impact of Intel will be
minimal, stating that Intel ‘‘is a poor vehicle for assessing
the interests of Web site owners against commercially
harmful scrapers’’. 74 While Hamidi’s actions may have
annoyed Intel, they were unlikely to cause actual economic harm. Hamidi’s interference with the network
did not ‘‘compromise any core aspect of [Intel’s] business’’, 75 as opposed to robot cases where the interference
directly affets the plaintiff’s ability to provide services to
other users. As such, Intel was unable to show the irreparable harm that was required for an injunction. Further,
Intel failed to satisfy its self-help obligation by not
directing employees to request that their names be
removed from Hamidi’s mailing list; by contrast, in
robot cases, the plaintiff rarely has the opportunity to
take effective self-help measures. 76

The Future of Electronic Trespass: Sotelo
Although there have not been any reported post-Intel email or robot cases, an Illinois district court recently
applied electronic trespass to spyware. In Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC, et al., 77 the court allowed the plaintiff to
proceed with a claim in trespass against the defendants
for allegedly installing spyware surreptitiously on the
plaintiff’s computer. The defendants argued that since
the plaintiff could close every pop-up advertisement as it
appeared, there could not be any actual damage. The
court held that this argument ignored ‘‘the reality of
computer and Internet use. . .’’. 78 In its conception of the
potential damages that could be claimed by the plaintiff,
the court included ‘‘wasted time, computer security
breaches, lost productivity, and additional burdens on
the computer’s memory and display capabilities’’. 79 This
list of injuries is consistent with eBay, as it either relates
specifically to the capacity of the plaintiff’s computer, or
to time spent by the plaintiff servicing his computer in
relation to the defendant’s actions. 80 The recognition
that electronic trespass is equally applicable to an individual user’s personal computers as it is to a corporation’s
server farm has the potential to encourage a diversity of
cases based in trespass to chattels. 81 One can hope that
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viewing the legal rationale behind electronic trespass
through varied factual situations will help settle questions related to the required level of harm in the United
States. 82

III. Do Property Rights Exist on the
Internet?

T
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he question of whether or not electronic trespass
can succeed in Canada is, at its core, a debate over
the appropriate role, or even existence, of property on
the Internet. Holding that a party can enforce private
property rights arising from electronic communications
necessarily presupposes that there is a property right that
can be enforced. Unsurprisingly, this is not something all
commentators are ready to concede. Indeed, critics of
electronic trespass are wary about the imposition of
property norms on the Internet, warning that it
‘‘threatens the very foundations of the web’’. 83 This concern is primarily advanced through the argument that
electronic trespass gives property rights reserved for chattels to intangible objects.

Does Electronic Trespass Give Property
Rights to an Intangible Object?
American courts have consistently concluded with little
difficulty, or even discussion, that computer networks are
property for the purposes of trespass to chattels. Laura
Quilter criticizes this assumption as obscuring fundamental questions about the nature of property on the
Internet: ‘‘While computers are undoubtedly chattels, it
is questionable whether electronic networks and computer processing power also qualify as chattel.’’ 84 In a
similar manner, Daniel Hunter questions the willingness
of courts to apply property rights to intangible things
such as bandwidth and processing power: ‘‘With the
exception of the computer itself, none of these ‘chattels’
are actually chattels at all. There is no private property in
bandwidth or processing power or network.’’ 85 While it
is likely correct that an owner does not have a property
interest in something as ephemeral as processing power,
the above critiques mischaracterize the property interests
protected by electronic trespass.
The hardware making up the network in an electronic trespass case can be identified as a chattel without
any controversy: the hard drives, memory boards, computer racks, among other hardware items, are all tangible
objects that possess an identifiable value. 86 If an agent of
Bidder’s Edge walked off with eBay’s physical servers,
eBay would have a straightforward action in conversion.
However, as the court noted in eBay, it is not clear if
eBay could make a similar claim if Bidder’s Edge
somehow stole its bandwidth. 87 Applying trespass to
chattels to this example, it is logical to conclude that
eBay should not be able to sustain an action in trespass
for interference with bandwidth; bandwidth, as an intangible thing, cannot sustain damage as contemplated by
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property law. 88 Thus, Wendy Adams argues that in order
for actions in electronic trespass to be successful, courts
rely on a legal fiction that transforms ‘‘processing activity
into an object of property rights’’. 89
The difficulty with the above critique is that electronic trespass does not protect the property interest of
intangible things such as bandwidth and processing
power in and of themselves. Rather, electronic trespass
considers these things as intangible attributes of the
physical hardware. When the court in CompuServe held
that the interference diminished the server’s processing
power, it was not protecting the processing power, but
rather, relying on the diminished processing power as
proof of the interference to the server. Consider by
analogy the effect of an interference with a possessory
interest in a car. The main attribute of the car, the reason
the car has value to its owner (in a utilitarian sense, at
least), is motion. If the owner is prevented from using the
car due to an interference from another party — i.e., if he
or she is unable to use the car to move — the owner will
have an action in trespass to chattels against the other
party. The court would not give much credence to the
other party’s argument that his or her actions only interfered with the movement of the car, which as something
intangible cannot be the subject of property rights. The
right of the owner to use the car free from interference is
exactly what is protected from trespass. Similarly, the
main functional attribute of a server is its processing
power. If someone interfered with the server in a way
that restricted the owner’s ability to use the server’s
processing power, the owner has a claim in trespass
based on interference to the server, not the processing
power. Adams states: ‘‘There is an object, the server, and
there is activity, the processing of requests, but the
activity and the object are not one and the same.’’ 90
While critics of electronic trespass are wary of using
place metaphors such as ‘‘cyberplace’’ when describing
the Internet, 91 they continue to rely on metaphor to the
extent that they separate the activity of the Internet from
its physical reality. Under this conception, the activity of
the server is something more than a mere function of the
physical hardware: it is a legal space that exists separately
from the physical hardware that produces the activity. In
effect, focusing on the activity of the server as the legal
object severs property rights from a chattel (the server)
just because the chattel has a primarily intangible function.
A less theoretical criticism is that, while ostensibly
about the protection of chattels, electronic trespass is
really about the protection of information: the Web site
may just be a function of the server, but it is the Web site
that is actually being protected by electronic trespass. To
quote a rather caustic passage from a decision in Ticketmaster:
[Deleting the claim in trespass to chattels] should hurt
no one’s policy feelings; after all, what is being attempted is
to apply a medieval common law concept in an entirely

Electronic Trespass in Canada: The Protection of Private Property on the Internet

new situation which should be disposed of by modern law
designed to protect intellectual property interests. 92
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Indeed, electronic trespass cases tend to involve situations where the action in question threatened the protection of commercial data. 93 Electronic trespass allowed
eBay to stop a competitor from crawling its database
without having to resort to copyright law. However, criticizing electronic trespass because it may intersect with
intellectual property rights unduly limits the scope of
Internet law to purely intellectual property matters. As
discussed above, electronic trespass can arise in situations
that have nothing to do with the protection of copyright,
such as spam or spyware. More importantly, the right to
exclude is a fundamental power given to the possessor of
a chattel in property law, 94 and is not dependent on the
possessor’s reasons. Once it is established that there is a
property right to protect, courts do not differentiate
between a reasonable attempt to exclude and an unreasonable one. 95 Instead of rejecting electronic trespass on
policy grounds because it can be used to shield intellectual property from competitors, concerns over the protection of intellectual property through property law
should be dealt with through existing antitrust or intellectual property legislation.

IV. Is Electronic Trespass Actionable
in Canada?

W

hile trespass to chattels has been revived in the
United States, it still languishes in relative obscurity in Canada. Having discussed whether property rights
even exist on the Internet, it is useful now to examine
whether these property rights can be protected at
common law in Canada by the tort of electronic trespass.
Despite the paucity of case law, 96 the following definition represents the general consensus among Canadian
authorities: trespass to chattels is actionable ‘‘where the
defendant directly and intentionally (or negligently)
interferes with a chattel in the possession of the plaintiff’’. 97 While the elements of the tort in Canada are
similar to the requirements in the United States, there
are two possible differences in the tort’s potential application. The first difference concerns the tangible quality
of electronic signals — i.e., could Thrifty-Tel be followed
in Canada? While courts in the United States have found
that electrons are sufficiently tangible for actions in trespass, it is not clear that a Canadian court would come to
a similar conclusion. The second difference concerns the
likely absence of the need to show actual damage at
common law in Canada, removing a substantial stumbling block faced in the American actions.

Can One Trespass with an Electron?
In Thrifty-Tel, the court considered for the first time
whether electronic signals were sufficiently tangible to
sustain a claim in trespass to chattels in California. In
holding that the electronic signals were sufficient, the
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court relied on previously recognized actions in trespass
to land based on microscopic particles, smoke, and
sound waves. 98 The acceptance of an action over electronic signals was essential for the creation of electronic
trespass. A Canadian court faced with the facts in ThriftyTel would likewise find an absence of any prior
authority extending intangible incursions to trespass to
chattels. However, a Canadian court would not have any
significant prior authority allowing a trespass to land
based on an intangible excursion.
The volume of case law supporting the extension of
trespass to intangible incursions is minimal. The Court
of Appeal of Ontario in Bower v. Richardson Construction Co. Ltd. 99 allowed damage to an adjoining property
caused by vibrations emanating from a steam pile driver
to be compensated in trespass. In McDonald et al. v.
Associated Fuels Ltd. et al., 100 the British Columbia
Supreme Court suggested in obiter that damage caused
by carbon monoxide blown into a residence from an
exhaust pipe could be actionable in trespass to land.
These two rather antiquated cases have not been followed in subsequent decisions, and are at odds with the
general treatment of intangible incursions in trespass
law. 101 Instead of opening trespass up to intangible incursions, Canadian courts have persisted in holding that any
action concerned with an intangible interference to a
property interest, such as the movement of smoke or
sound, is properly pleaded in nuisance. 102 This preference is seen in Phillips v. California Standard Co. 103 The
defendant’s ‘‘artificially generated seismic waves’’ 104 —
used to search for oil deposits — coursed through the
plaintiff’s property, causing damage. While the plaintiff
brought an action in trespass, the court held that the
plaintiff’s action was properly in nuisance: ‘‘trespass
involves a physical entry on the property of another and
in the case at bar that physical entry never took
place’’. 105Despite the usual practice of dealing with intangible incursions in nuisance, however, all is not lost for
the potential plaintiff. The Canadian common law’s general recognition of the importance of the protection of
property rights and the need for legitimate compensation suggest that a Canadian court would likely allow an
action in electronic trespass to proceed.
Clifton Merrell has criticized the holding in ThriftyTel, contending that ‘‘[e]lectrons seem entirely too ethereal and metaphysical to justify a cause of action at
law’’. 106 Further, allowing trespass by electronic signals
would lead to ‘‘absurd results’’, such as claims in trespass
to ‘‘fax machine[s] [and] household appliances attached
to an outlet’’. 107 Merrell’s litigious dystopia, however, may
not be as ridiculous as first imagined. It is admittedly
difficult to think of situations where a person’s possessory interest in a toaster would be subject to a temporary
interference by means of electrons. Nonetheless, if an
intentional power surge over the electricity grid caused
the toaster to burst into flames, it would be counterintuitive to deny the owner of the burnt toaster a claim in

170
tort simply because the fire was caused by the movement of electrons, as opposed to a more tangible interference. The damage resulting from electronic trespass is
not usually as obvious as a burning server farm; nonetheless, the lack of physical indicia by no means equals an
absence of damage or interference. 108 Denying a claim
because the interference was not obviously physical
would conflict with the basic purpose of property torts at
common law: the protection of an interest in a chattel. 109
While the different categories of tort are theoretically organized based on the nature of the interference
— i.e., conversion for permanent interference, trespass to
chattels for transitory interference — the main focus is
on the actual impact on the property. As even the sceptical court in Ticketmaster noted:
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The computer is a piece of tangible personal property.
It is operated by mysterious electronic impulses which did
not exist when the law of trespass to chattels was developed,
but the principles should not be too different. If the electronic impulses can do damage to the computer or to its
function in a comparable way to taking a hammer to a piece
of machinery, then it is no stretch to recognize that damage
as trespass to chattels and provide a legal remedy for it. 110

The hardware that makes up the Internet has the same
property interests as any other chattel. Courts should
therefore not have to unduly stretch the common law to
realize that a server could be severely damaged or curtailed by electronic signals. 111 Disallowing claims in electronic trespass based on the questionable tangibility of
electronic signals would deny compensation for plaintiffs
who have suffered real damage, an arbitrary result that
would showcase the inability of the law to account for
technological progress. Of course, property interests can
still be protected under nuisance. However, as discussed
below, nuisance is not the proper tort theory to protect
property rights on the Internet. 112

Is Actual Damage Required?
A particular fixation in the American case law concerns
the requirement to show actual damage in trespass to
chattels. Although no Canadian court has specifically
addressed this issue, a plaintiff likely does not have to
show actual damage to succeed on a claim in trespass to
chattels in Canada. The Canadian Encyclopedic Digest
summarizes the requirements for the tort as follows: ‘‘any
unauthorized touching or moving of a chattel is actionable at the suit of the possessor, even though no harm
ensues ’’. 113 One of the few appellate-level discussions of
trespass to chattels advances the opposite proposition. In
London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International
Ltd., Southin J.A. at the B.C. Court of Appeal adopted the
following definition from Halsbury’s Laws of England in
her dissent: ‘‘Trespass to goods is an unlawful disturbance of the possession of the goods by seizure or
removal or by a direct act causing damage to the
goods.’’ 114 This statement is not particularly persuasive,
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however, as the question of whether damage was
required was not at issue, and in any event the dissent
was rejected on appeal. 115
Lower courts have shown a willingness to allow
actions in trespass to chattel without actual damage. In
Hudson’s Bay Co. v. White, 116 the defendant stole five
pairs of gloves from the plaintiff department store. The
defendant was apprehended by security, and the gloves
were returned undamaged. The court held that trespass
to chattels was actionable without damage. In the
absence of proof of actual damage, however, only nominal damages would be available. 117 In Burns v. Financial
Bailiff Services Ltd., 118 the court held that the defendant
bailiffs trespassed on the plaintiffs’ van when they unlawfully entered the van with the intent to seize it. Since the
plaintiffs ‘‘were never deprived of the use of the van . . .
they suffered no actual damages’’, 119 and were thus
unable to claim pecuniary damages. Despite the lack of
actual damage, however, the claim in trespass to chattels
was still used as an actionable wrong for the award of
punitive damages. While the case law is not conclusive, it
suggests that trespass to chattels is actionable per se. 120
An action in electronic trespass, the issue of tangibility
aside, should therefore be easier to establish in Canada
than in the United States.

V. Is Electronic Trespass the Best
Way to Protect Property Interests?

E

ven if it is accepted that there are property interests
on the Internet that need to be protected by property torts, it is not immediately obvious that this has to
be done by trespass to chattels. A number of commentators have argued that the development of electronic trespass will lead to the ‘‘tragedy of the anticommons’’. In an
attempt to protect the integrity of the Internet, these
critics have called for the adoption of a cyber-nuisance
regime that balances the interests of owners and users. 121
For supporters of electronic trespass, what the critics are
calling for ‘‘is the equivalent of declaring open season on
cyber property, giving uncompensated rights to allcomers for the use of a web site’s limited resources’’. 122
This position is unnecessarily alarmist, as the cyber-nuisance regime does not allow for unrestricted access.
Nonetheless, the creation of a cyber-nuisance regime
would leave an identifiable species of chattel open to
physical interference in a manner inconsistent with
Canadian common law. The policy issues raised by
critics of electronic trespass need not be brushed aside,
however; the recognition of the importance of consent
in the architecture of the Internet 123 will allow for the
adoption of electronic trespass in a manner that ensures
the continued beneficial development of the Internet.
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Will Electronic Trespass Lead to the
Tragedy of the Anticommons?
Whether or not property rights exist on the Internet,
some commentators have argued (as mentioned above)
that electronic trespass should not be supported because
it will lead to the ‘‘tragedy of the anticommons’’: ‘‘no one
will be allowed to access competitors’ cyberspace ‘assets’
without either licensing access or agreeing to some other
transactionally expensive permission mechanism’’,
resulting in an ‘‘inefficient underuse’’ of resources. 124 Further, cordoning off the Internet into exclusive territories
will lead to a decline in innovation 125 and free speech. 126
Daniel Kearney argues that the anticommons movement
unrealistically sidelines the role of commerce in the present Internet, relying on a mythical conception of a
borderless Internet: ‘‘The Internet did not arrive with a
set of pre-existing legal entitlements.’’ 127 In Kearney’s
conception of a market-driven Internet, commercial parties should be left to their own devices to come to agreements over how best to allocate resources. 128 In this
sense, market forces alone will ensure that Web site
providers keep the Internet open to an acceptable
degree. 129 Additionally, other commentators argue that
the dream of an open Internet is not realizable given
even the current level of technological methods designed
to block access. 130
Whatever the conclusion to this argument, it needs
to be recognized that this dispute is essentially academic
and does not adequately account for the global nature of
the Internet — the Internet has continued to grow
unabated despite the rise of electronic trespass in the
United States. And as is argued below, the cyber-nuisance regime supported by members of the anticommons movement is unsatisfying. Instead, the concerns of
the anticommons movement can be met through a
robust notion of implied consent.

Should Electronic Trespass Be Dealt with
in Nuisance?
The creation of a doctrine of cyber-nuisance relies on the
flexibility of nuisance law to balance competing interests. 131 Steven Kam argues that trespass to chattel’s
‘‘harm-based analysis focuses on literal damages but asks
few questions as to the worth of the trespassory
activity’’. 132Thus, using the balanced approach of nuisance, the court could properly contrast the competing
worth of the defendant’s speech in Intel with the defendant’s commercial goals in eBay. 133
The idea of using nuisance to deal with electronic
interferences is not a novel idea in Canada. In
Motherwell v. Motherwell, 134 the court held that a claim
in nuisance was actionable for communications carried
over the telephone system. Although it was the content
and character of the communications that were actionable in Motherwell, rather than the communications
themselves, it suggests that technological communications can carry the tort of nuisance in a manner that
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bridges the physical distance between a plaintiff and
defendant. Despite this precedent, however, cyber-nuisance should not be adopted in favour of electronic trespass.
Nuisance is properly focused on protecting an occupier’s proprietary interest in the use and enjoyment of his
or her real property; Linden thus describes nuisance as
an ‘‘environmental tort’’. 135 With the possible exception
of claims brought by users whose home computers had
been infected with spyware, 136 the connection to the
plaintiff’s real property is not evident in the electronic
cases discussed above: where, for instance, is the proprietary interest in real property in CompuServe? The
overburdened servers at the heart of this case were most
likely not kept on the plaintiff’s premises. It would be
difficult to argue that the use of servers at an off-site
server farm would somehow affect the use and enjoyment of a separate piece of real property.
The above argument, while attractive in its simplicity, is not wholly persuasive. Nuisance should not be
rejected simply because it only applies to real property,
and is therefore inapplicable to the Internet. Kam sensibly describes this objection as a mere ‘‘formalistic
obstacle’’ that should not be used to prevent nuisance
from grappling with the ‘‘problems of inherently communal cyberspace’’. 137 The problem with casting this
objection aside, however, is that the focus on real property is not merely formalistic. The question that needs to
be asked is whether nuisance can be extended to include
the types of property interests at play on the Internet. It is
on this basis that cyber-nuisance should be rejected. The
balancing of interests in nuisance is a direct response to
interactions unique to the use and enjoyment of real
property and cannot easily extend to the operation of the
Internet in a manner that adequately protects property
rights.
The balancing of interests in nuisance is a recognition that real property does not exist in isolation, but is
surrounded by other parcels of real property in a
common environment:
The ambition of nuisance law has never extended to
providing every plaintiff with a serene hermitage, but has
been limited to providing restrictions on the most intolerable or obnoxious of the unpleasant consequences of living
in proximity to other members of society. In this respect the
sanctity of any person’s proprietary interests must be
weighed against the competing interests put forward by
others. 138

As such, an occupier should reasonably expect that the
effects of an action in a neighbouring property would
necessarily flow into his or her real property. Since the
occupier can be expected to have the use of his or her
real property interfered with to a reasonable degree by a
neighbour’s actions, the neighbour’s motives become relevant. The electronic trespass cases discussed above do
not fit within the general purpose and concern of nuisance. The conception of the Internet as a common environment where information flows freely between indi-
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vidual servers is at odds with the reality of an Internet
made up of individual servers that can accept or reject
communications deliberately sent from other servers.
This is true even if, as a matter of course, individual
servers accept incoming communications. The spam sent
by the plaintiff in CompuServe was not the indirect
overflow of electronic signals from the defendant’s property; it was a direct incursion onto the plaintiff’s network
in a manner more consistent with trespass than nuisance.
Cyber-nuisance is premised on the idea that some
level of interference with other servers should be
allowed, regardless of whether the owner of the server
consented to the interference. What is important is the
purpose of the interference. Because the interference in
Intel was worthwhile, under a cyber-nuisance regime
Hamidi would be able to trespass on Intel’s servers.
Therefore, under cyber-nuisance owners have to accept a
certain level of interference with their chattels, despite a
legitimate property interest in the functionality of
servers. This opens up a species of chattels to a level of
interference that would be unacceptable with other chattels with more obviously physical functions. Supporters
of cyber-nuisance would argue that, while there is no
social utility in allowing parties to trespass on another’s
interest in physical chattels, there are strong reasons to
allow interferences with property rights over the
Internet. However, to the extent that these concerns are
valid, they can be adequately accounted through a consideration of the role consent plays in the availability of
electronic trespass.

Consent and Electronic Trespass
The abandonment of cyber-nuisance as a viable alternative in favour of electronic trespass does not mean the
common law will inevitably be used to protect the property interests of Web site owners to the ultimate detriment of the Internet and society. In advocating an ‘‘open
Internet’’, Jennifer Granick, the executive director of the
Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society,
states:
The law should treat the Internet as open by default -- a
public resource rather than a gated community. This doesn’t
mean that we can’t protect our networked computers or
data with copyright law, passwords, firewalls or perhaps
even terms-of-service agreements. But rather than asking
whether a user obtained permission to access computers
connected to the Internet, the law should ask whether the
owner did anything to prevent public access. 139

Granick correctly highlights that impracticality of
requiring express consent for every communication (and
thus every use of other hardware) on the Internet. 140 It is
not apparent, however, why this necessarily means the
Internet needs to be treated as a public resource. Adams
argues that the defence of consent will not have any
practical effect in rationalizing the use of electronic trespass because plaintiffs will simply contact potential
defendants and request that they stop accessing their
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server. 141 This is a curious objection, since it suggests that
the Internet should operate on the basis of intractable or
forced consent where, short of removing one’s server
from the network, one has to accept all incoming communications. Granick recognizes that system owners can
legitimately take steps to prevent access, an action at
odds with the concept of a public resource. The Internet
Granick describes resembles private property that the
public has an open invitation to use, such as commercial
establishments. The Supreme Court of Canada has held
that extending an open invitation to enter to the public
does not give the public any general right of access. 142
Open access does not require the extinguishment of
property rights.
Electronic trespass can operate within the framework of an open Internet as long as Canadian courts
follow the American jurisprudence in its treatment of
consent. In CompuServe, for instance, the court held that
the plaintiff had given its tacit consent to use its server
because anyone could send e-mails over its network.
This consent was removed when it requested that the
defendant not send spam over its network. Similarly, in
eBay the court held that the plaintiff had given users of
its system a conditional access; crawling the site was
expressly restricted by the Web site’s terms of use. By
crawling eBay’s Web site in the face of an explicit request
to cease such activity, Bidder’s Edge exceeded its consent.
Thus, an action will only lie in electronic trespass if the
plaintiff has withdrawn its consent, or the defendant has
exceeded the plaintiff’s consent. 143
Consent or license is a full defence to an action in
trespass. Therefore, if courts are going to enforce actions
in trespass on the Internet, it is important to consider
how the content of the consent or license will be determined. In cases where the parties have entered into a
licensing agreement, it is relatively straightforward to
determine what actions would exceed the scope of the
license. Determining when consent has been exceeded
or restricted is more difficult, but can be accomplished
through the recognition of implied consent and the
ability to expressly restrict consent.
The recognition of implied consent on the Internet
is important because, in its absence, every electronic
communication made without express consent would
give rise to a claim in electronic trespass. Fortunately, the
reality of the Internet’s technological architecture suggests that the vast majority of electronic communications
over the Internet take place on the basis of implied
consent:
[T]he most basic functions of the Internet — sharing
wires and sending and receiving messages — would be
impossible without the cooperation of every single machine
connected to the global network. This cooperation, contrary
to judicial assumptions, requires implied consent to outside
use of bandwidth and processing power. 144

Judicial recognition of the implied consent inherent in
the Internet will allow electronic trespass to be applied
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in a beneficial and reasonable manner. Thus, a user will
not be trespassing for merely visiting a Web site —
opening a Web site up to the Internet implies that other
servers will use the network’s resources. Indeed, technology issues aside, it is counterintuitive to hold that an
owner has not given the public an invitation to use its
resources when the owner has taken steps to connect his
or her network to the Internet. Similarly, a user would
not be trespassing with a robot if the user was not given
any indication that his or her access was not permitted.
While it is easy to find implied consent in basic
electronic communications — i.e., ‘‘visiting’’ a Web site
— courts will have a more difficult time establishing the
limits of implied consent on the Internet. Given the lack
of any clear definition of the content of implied consent,
it is tempting to call for the adoption of legislation to
outline the type of behaviour electronic trespass is meant
to catch. The benefit of legislation, in theory, is that if the
scope of consent is set by legislation, then everyone can
govern his or her actions accordingly. However, the risk
of enacting legislation is that any list of acceptable behaviour will quickly become outdated. There is a significant lag time in the creation of legislation; any statute
designed to respond to any specific technological
problem may very well be outdated by the time it
receives royal assent. Moreover, courts have already
shown themselves able to adapt to changing standards of
Internet behaviour in determining the scope of acceptable behaviour over the Internet. In 1267623 Ontario
Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc. 145 the court gave judicial
approval of the concept of ‘‘netiquette’’ or Internet etiquette. 146 In this case, the court held that spamming was
a breach of netiquette for the purposes of a contractual
term between the spammer and an ISP. Netiquette can
thus be used to remove the benefit of implied consent in
situations where, for instance, spam is sent over a computer network, spyware is installed on a user’s personal
computer, or possibly even when a robot excessively
crawls another server. Leaving the categories of behaviour open will allow courts to enforce property rights in
situations where the defendant has acted badly and thus
deserves sanction (especially important in the absence of
any harm limitation at common law in Canada).
The implied consent discussed above can, of course,
be expressly restricted. However, with the exception of
clearly communicated restrictions between parties such
as in eBay, it is not yet clear what steps need to be taken
to effectively communicate the restriction. One possible
way is through a Web site’s terms of use, often called
browserwrap agreements. In CREA v. Sutton, 147 the
court let the plaintiff rely on its Web site’s terms of use,
despite the fact that it was never brought to the defen-

dant’s attention. 148While the decision in CREA is relatively narrow — the defendant should have known there
would have been a terms of use provision because it had
a similar document on its own Web site — it suggests
that in certain situations the scope of consent to use a
network’s resources can be outlined in the Web site’s
terms of use. Communication of express restrictions can
also rely on netiquette. For instance, a restriction on
consent can be communicated through commonly
accepted technological protections. If a user has to circumvent security protections to access a network, or if
the robot crawls a site in violation of the terms in the
Robot Exclusion Standard, it is likely that he or she has
breached the owner’s implied consent.
By allowing the content of consent to be decided on
a case-by-case basis, courts can develop a flexible notion
of implied consent informed by notions of netiquette
and common practices, and identify situations when the
implied consent has been restricted. This will allow electronic trespass to be used to curtail less desirable activities, and support the use of technological means to prevent unwanted access 149 without unduly limiting the
socially useful aspects of the Internet.

VI. Conclusion

W

ithout denying its revolutionary impact, the
Internet is essentially just a series of interconnected chattels. Despite the use of monikers such as
‘‘cyberplace’’, the Internet is rooted in the physical world,
and the transmission of electronic signals over the
Internet can cause actual damage off-line. Richard
Epstein interprets the debate over electronic trespass as
dealing with ‘‘the hard question [of] whether technological changes could ever lead us to abandon the presumption that a deliberate trespass counts as a private
wrong’’. 150 This paper suggests that the answer should be
no. As a means to protect property rights in chattels,
trespass to chattels has remained relatively consistent
since the Middle Ages, 151 evidence of the common law’s
ability to accommodate technological change. 152 The
Internet is changing the manner in which people relate
to each other, but the common law need not be forced
in radical new directions to deal with the inevitable
problems that arise any time two or more people
interact. A computer network is a chattel, holding the
same property rights as any other tangible object; the
mere act of connecting a computer network to another
network should not automatically open up the network
to unlimited interference, to the detriment of any possessory interests.
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